In 1943 when the deservedly little-known University of Sydney China scholar, Richard
something of a surprise to the rest of the world and particularly to political scientists outside China, given that the leadership of the CCP remained united and faced no state crisis, and that there had been no significant increase in mass unrest. Hu Jintao proceeded to quote Deng Xiaoping's precise words:
We Communists always oppose a one-party dictatorship … The CCP certainly doesn't have a program to monopolise government because one party can only rule in its own interests and won't act according to the Will of the People. Moreover, it goes against democratic politics. 1978) . Hu also quoted Chen Yun's speech at the same Central Work Conference: 'Only democracy can provide stable norms for political behaviour and ensure the mobilisation of popular initiative for economic growth ' (People's Daily 1979) . As a result of the changes introduced by the 3 rd Plenum, direct elections to the county level of the territorial administrative hierarchy were introduced in the middle of 1979 (Goodman 1985) , and village and township elections, as well as those at the county level, had been 2 These are the three simultaneous conditions required for successful regime change in the 20 th century according to the comprehensive research undertaken by Ted Robert Gurr and Jack Goldstone (1991) . 3 Mao Zedong (1938) . Those familiar with Alabama Three will note that the official translation of this quote was employed.
When considering the electoral system to be adopted, at one point it appeared that a majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly favoured a system of absolute proportional representation where the number of votes cast nationally would lead to the proportion of delegates elected to the NPC. Their initial view was that this was the fairest and most democratic system. The CCP successfully argued that this would lead to unstable and weak government, where the interests of the minority would be trampled underfoot. Far better, they said, to have a UK style 'first past the post' voting system in single constituencies. This would, they argued, always ensure at least two strong political parties in the NPC able to pass legislation and support the work of government.
The CCP pointed to an analysis of the results of the 6 May 2010 General Election in the UK demonstrating the effect of different electoral systems on the political outcome to prove their point (Table 1) . 4 The leaders of the CCP dismissed the various opposition claims that a first past the post electoral system ensured their political futures as 'sour grapes from those who do not have the national interest at heart.' As the leaders of the CCP frequently argued, in a multi-party system it is necessary to ensure that a political party can achieve a majority of power with only 34 percent of the popular vote, as has long been the case with the UK electoral system (Johnston et al. 2001; Johnston & Pattie 2006: 273 The Constituent Assembly agreed that direct provincial-level (autonomous regions and directly subordinated municipalities as well as provinces) elections should occur at the same time as direct national elections. At the same time it could not agree on whether 4 First past the post is the UK system, based on single member constituencies. Proportional Representation is a list system for the entire country, as in Israel. Australian elections run on the Alternative Vote, in single member constituencies. The single transferable vote is a multi-member constituency system practiced in Ireland and Tasmania. Germany has a variety of Additional Member system where competitions in single member constituencies are supplemented by deputies elected through a list system elected by proportional representation.
the Tibet Autonomous Region should be permitted a greater degree of autonomy, as some delegates argued; or whether a Federal constitution would be more appropriate, as members of the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League petitioned. Both these issues were slated for referenda to be held at the time of the 2020 general election.
The political parties
One remarkable feature of the party system as it has developed since 2012 is the extent to which it has been shaped by organizations that emerged in the late 1940s just before, and during, the establishment of the PRC. In that era the CCP recognized a number of the other political parties as its partners in a national coalition. These parties all came together in the China People's Political Consultative Conference during the late 1940s, and remained active during the PRC, though perhaps more nominally during the Cultural Revolution (Seymour 1987 
Issues of public policy
A number of public policy issues have become particularly salient since the 2015 election and these are likely to carry into the election campaign: corruption, which remains high in the public consciousness; housing, a significant indicator of class and class divisions in politics; and regional development.
Corruption
One of the problems with public debate on corruption has been the lack of agreement about its definition, causes and remedies (Liu 1983: 618; Ma 1989: 40; Rocca 1992: 402) . Everyone knows it exists but there is little agreement on precisely what 'it' is. The CCP has long seen corruption as a moral problem and so prescribes that its cadres should be educated and trained to be virtuous (Goodman 1987) . A further significant Public perception of corruption focuses to a large extent on the relationship between government and business (Ting 2006) . The problem though for government, the CCP and indeed to some extent all politicians is that not all relationships between government and business are corrupt. While government (and to date the CCP) has attempted to ensure its cadres do not act corruptly, it also has to educate the electorate in this respect. Paradoxically, executing a few leading cadres occasionally may actually encourage others to either be less greedy or not to act corruptly, but at the same time it does little to convince citizens that there is less corruption or that the government is under control.
Simply put corruption might be regarded as the private use of public resources, or the engagement in actions knowing them to be either socially or legally unacceptable. There is, however, always a problem of boundary maintenance. Social acceptability may be highly relative, as is legal practice. Moreover, the circumstances under which corruption becomes a focus of public concern are always highly politicised and raise questions about who controls the forum and methods of public debate and concern. In Chongqing, Still there is no doubt that corruption exists and that it is a matter of public concern.
There will be candidates who campaign in some areas on specific anti-corruption platforms, and a few are likely to be elected if the experience of elections elsewhere is any guide. Although corruption is not a programmatic issue it is more likely to damage the CCP than any other party, simply because it has been in government for so long and exclusively. Unfortunately for the CDNCA and its attempt to turn itself into a Eurostyle conservative party, the issue may also have some negative impact on its success, because of its inherent links with the business world. Populist parties, such as the Peasants Federation, always benefit more from debates on corruption.
Housing
Housing has become increasingly a marker of social division since the emergence of a significant private housing market in the 1990s, and one which has considerable potential for class conflict even if mediated through electoral politics. Two trends have occurred simultaneously. One has been the demise of the social unit as a provider of community and social service, including housing (Bray 2005) . Before the Reform Era all government organisations, educational institutions, and economic enterprises provided housing (and other services) to their staff. The neoliberalist turn has introduced greater economic efficiency into resource management at all levels and in all sectors (Lee & Zhu 2006) . One consequence is that previously work-supplied housing has been turned into private housing that is rented or sold on a housing market. The second trend has been the development of new gated community housing estates (Tomba 2004 ). The evidence is that this has become an almost inalienable principle of urban planning perhaps, at least partially, for reasons of social control. Almost all of these new housing estates are gated regardless of status, though there are clearly class and income differences in access to specific gated communities (Tomba 2005) .
Before the 1990s housing already was a marker of social distinction with better public supplied housing being much appreciated. In the past, however, housing quality was essentially a function of career and appointment, and less under the individual's control.
Differences in quality were also less visible, as well as probably less in absolute terms.
Housing reform, the growth of an entrepreneurial class with greater real disposable income, and the inevitable development of a luxury housing market, has made housing differences both highly visible and also matters of public debate. And where public resources may be seen to be, or may have been, in some sense involved in an essentially private housing development, the argument can be made that some of the housing made available in this way should be subsidised either by local government or the developer to enable the less wealthy to participate (Tomba & Tang 2008) . Interestingly this pressure for equity in new housing developments appears to have been limited to the rust, iron and coal belts of North and Northeast China. Here the CCP itself has campaigned for equity of access in nominally joint private-public housing developments, and to have built at least part of its support base this way.
The development of gated communities has led to concerns of control by some of the residents' groups. Residents are always asked to pay for security and other community services. At the same time, for both political and economic reasons, local governments will not surrender their involvement in, or oversight of, some community functions.
Clearly where local government has been centrally involved in the development of new housing communities, it will retain an interest in their operation. Equally this is likely to be a point of tension between residents and local government. The CDNCA has been particularly active in mobilising support from residents in new housing estates, and not just those that cater for the very wealthiest.
Regional development
Regional development is probably the most important and longest established public policy arena in China. There are essentially two separate matters of debate. One is the rural-urban divide (Christiansen 1990; Chan 1994; Cheng & Selden 1994; Chan & Zhang 1999) . The other is the question of severe spatial inequality across China, highlighted by Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang in their reports to the State Council during the 1990s. 8 While the Peasants Federation is keen to play a central public policy role in the former debate, the latter debate is dominated by a perdictable coalition of the old left and the new entrepreneurial conservatives.
There can be no doubt that the standard of living in rural China remains low, and that there are far from equal life chances between those living on and off the land and those living in towns and cities. Rural GDP per capita is about one quarter of urban GDP per capita and service provision-schools, clinics, hospitals-in the countryside is well below that in the towns and cities. Before the emergence of the Peasants Federation and its various locally and provincially organised groups, these differences were acknowledged but little action was forthcoming. poverty alleviation went to nationally designated poverty counties rather than in programs to deliver specific benefits to rural areas. The issue of spatial inequality was first highlighted during the 1990s by those concerned about the impact of the Reform Era's policies on the interior of the country away from the Eastern seaboard. In general, during the Mao-dominated years of China's politics, each province and region was expected to be self-sufficient (Larsen 1992) . The regional development policy introduced with the Reform Era in the early 1980s changed all this by requiring provinces, and indeed localities, to build on their competitive advantage.
The result was that provinces with relatively easy access to the wealth and potential of the East Asian region prospered dramatically. By the mid-1990s GDP per capita in Guizhou, the poorest province, was only 8 percent of that in Shanghai, the wealthiest provincial-level jurisdiction.
In 1999 the reports by Hu and Wang, and the public debate they generated, fed into the formulation of a new regional development policy to 'Open Up the West,' which largely failed to deliver the desired results (Goodman 2002) . 
Referenda
Two referenda have been scheduled to occur at the time of the 2020 general election.
One is to consider a proposal for substantial autonomy of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
The other is for the adoption of a federal constitution. There is little possibility that either will receive majority support.
Tibet Autonomous Region
The issue of autonomy for the Tibet Autonomous Region came to a referendum because of the deadlock that emerged at the Constituent Assembly. There was nothing like a majority at that meeting favouring greater autonomy in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
The problem was that all but a handful of the delegates from the Tibet Autonomous
Region were vociferous in their support for an autonomy vote, with debate being carried out in the full view of the world's media. The solution was a national referendum, with a majority being required across China's voters as a whole if greater autonomy is to be granted. One of the more interesting features of international law appears to be that a territory can join another jurisdiction on the basis of a decision in that territory alone;
but that same territory cannot leave a jurisdiction of which it is part without the approval of the jurisdiction as a whole. Region is a costly project to maintain and it should be left to its own devices. There are also some extreme nationalists in a number of parties who have tried to argue that total independence, if accepted and implemented, would be a good idea since the Tibetans are not ethnically Chinese.
At the same time, the majority view seems to be that of the CCP. It has pointed out that even with greater autonomy the Tibet Autonomous Region is not economically viable.
As a landlocked country with a poorly performing economy, it will be looking not simply for allies, but also for aid and assistance. There are basically two places that support could come from. One is China, and having just achieved greater autonomy, Tibet would be unlikely to approach China in that way, irrespective of China's likely refusal. Moreover, China does currently provide aid and assistance, so that in the CCP's view there is little need for the greater autonomy being proposed (Zhou 2011:60) .
Support could also come from the USA. However, that possible relationship might also entail US military bases being established in the eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous
Region-anathema not only to the CCP but also to most Chinese.
Federalism
The issue of federalism is possibly more complex, though no more likely to lead to an acceptance. A referendum has been suggested by two political tendencies. One comprises the lawyers in the political parties, and particularly in the NPC, who argue that a federal system provides a superior system of checks and balances for a sophisticated modernised political system. It would also, of course, replace a single legal system with several systems at the federal and constituent state levels. The other consists of those in China who think that federalism will prove attractive to political forces on Taiwan and encourage them to consider reunification. These include, as might be expected, the Left Nationalists and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League.
The prospects for a federal China are far from new elements in debates on public policy.
Federalism was debated as a possible model in the early days of the Republic, and the CCP was initially a federal organisation (van de Ven 1992) . By 1930 federalism had become equated with feudalism in contemporary Chinese political discourse and so it was unlikely to be regarded favourably by modernising nationalists (Fitzgerald 1998) .
Economic federalism was easily embraced and implemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the economic reformers (Montinola, Qian & Weingast 1995) . There was some discussion of possible federal configurations for China's political system at the same time (Zhao 1982) , but these seem to have just disappeared like bamboo shoots without spring rain.
The CCP remains opposed to political federalism on the grounds of practicality.
Although it has embraced the project of direct elections, it has articulated concerns about another series of elections, which federalism would almost certainly necessitate, to a second chamber for the National People's Congress. The CCP has also articulated fears that a federal political system might impede the work of government. It has pointed to its world's best practice new superfast rail network as an example of what centralised government can achieve. As the CCP pointed out, both the USA and Australia barely have a long distance inter-city rail system let alone the latest generation bullet trains (The Economist 2010; Feng 2010).
Election 2020
At this distance even Directors of China Institutes would be hesitant to assay the results of the approaching election. After all, the element of uncertainty will have millions of
Chinese viewers glued to the CCTV Election Night Tally Room broadcast. The CCP remains likely to be the dominant political party. At the same time, with the passage of time one would expect both the CDNCA and the Peasants Federation to increase both their share of the vote and their numbers of deputies in the NPC. There will, however, be much to appreciate, notwithstanding prominent politicians being voted out of office and high-profile celebrities being elected. Election night 2020 will make for great television. 
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